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The Warrant of Attorney to Confess
Judgment
ROBERT IVI. HUNTER *
The practice of executing a warrant of attorney to
confess judgment is one of considerable antiquity Prior
to the time of our Revolutionary War, Blackstone in his
Commentarzes mentioned the practice in the following
words, "And therefore it is very usual, in order to
strengthen a creditor's security for the debtor to execute
a warrant of attorney to some attorney named by the cred-
itor, empowering him to confess a judgment by either of
the ways just now mentioned (by nihil dicit, cognovit ac-
tionem or non sum znformatus) in an action of debt to be
brought by the creditor against the debtor for the specific
sum due."1 The cognovzt action em referred to, was a
written confession given by the defendant after process
was sued out. The common term "cognovit note" is ap-
plied to a promissory note containing a warrant of attor-
ney to confess judgment. At one time such a warrant
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University.
12 CooLE's BLAxcssTo-,E (4th Ed. 1899) i152. The quotation is found in
Book III, p. 397, The Third Book of Commentaries was published in 1768, see I
CoolLY, supra p. 1.
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would have contained an authorization to file a cognovit
actwnem. Hence the adjective "cognovit." 2
It is customary to think of cognovit judgments m con-
nection with negotiable promissory notes, and they are un-
questionably more commonly encountered in that connec-
tion than in any other ' The Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law provides that, "The negotiable character of an
instrument otherwise negotiable is not affected by a pro-
vision which **2. authorizes a confession of judgment if
the instrument be not paid at maturity" ' This provision
is a part of the statutory law of every state except South
Dakota.'
But aside from the question of negotiability the atti-
tude toward the warrant of attorney to confess judgment
varies from one state to another In Ohio and many other
states the warrant is very commonly used, and it is safe to
assume that in such states more notes are issued which
contain such a clause than do not.' In addition to the
above quoted provision from the Negotiable Instruments
Law the Ohio General Code has a number of sections
which make reference to warrants of attorney' This ex-
'For instances of the use of the terms "cognovit judgment" and "cognovit
note" see Bulkley v. Green, 98 Ohio St. 55, 59, 120 N. E. 216 (1918), and First
National Bank v. Smith, 102 Ohio St. 120, p. 121, 130 N. E. 502 (1921). See
Drose v. Balla, 181 Ind. 491, 499, 104 N. E. 851, 854 (1914), for common law
distinctions.
'See Swisher v. Orrison .Cigar Co., 122 Ohio St. 195, 198, 171 N.E. 92
(1930).
'Section 5, OHio G. C., Sec. 8110.
'BRANNAN'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTS LAW (6th Ed. Beutel 1938) 7, no
similar provision is to be found in the English Bills of Exchange Act 1882,
after which the uniform N.I.L. was largely patterned, id. at 177.
' See Swisher v. Orrison Cigar Co., 122 Ohio St. 195, 198 (1930) cited
supra note 3. It has been said that approximately 82% of the banks of Penn-
sylvania use judgment notes. See Tanner, Unifority of Judgment Notes,
44 Dici L. RFv. 173 (1940). In at least a dozen other states they are more
or less widely used. See Notes, cited infra n. 8.
'OHio G. C., Sec. 11597, "An attorney who confesses judgment in a case,
at the time of making such confession, must produce the warrant of attorney for
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plicit recognition of their validity is quite different from
the attitude evidenced by statutory provisions in other
states which declare them unenforceable or void.' In still
other states the use of the warrant seems to be practically
unknown although not forbidden by statute.'
The widespread use of the cognovit note in this and
making it to the court before which he makes the confession, and the original
or a copy of the warrant shall be filed with the clerk."
Sec. 11598, "A warrant of attorney to confess judgment, executed by a person
in custody, in favor of the person at whose suit he is in custody, shall be of no
torce unless executed in presence of an attorney expressly named by the person
in custody, and signed by him as a witness."
Sec. 11282, "When the action is rightly brought in any county, according to
the provisions of the next preceding chapter, a summons may be issued to any
other county, against one or more of the defendants, at the plaintiff's request;
but no maker or acceptor, or if the bill be not accepted, no drawer, of an
instrument for the payment of money only, shall be held liable in an action
thereon, except on a warrant of attorney, in any county other than the one in
which he, or one of the joint makers, acceptors, or drawers, resides or is
summoned."
Sec. 11139, "The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice or affect securities
given, or liens obtained in good faith, for value, but judgments by confession on
warrants of attorney rendered within two months prior to such assignment, or
ccurities given within such time to create a preference among creditors, or to
-e ure a pre-existing debt other than upon real estate for the purchase money
thereof, shall be of no force or validity as against such claims for labor, in
case of assignment, to the extent above provided."
"See Ann. "Constitutionality, construction, application, and effect of statutes
uz'alidating powers of attorney to confess judg ent or contracts gtzmng suci
power." 111 A.L.R. 1407, Note, Validity of warrant of attorney to confess
Judgment. (1938) 16 TEX. L. Rxv. 585; Note (1931) 44 HARV. L. REv. 1275,
1277. From these notes it would appear that warrants of attorney are void or
their use seriously restricted by statute in the following states Alabama, Flor-
ida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Jersey, New York, New Mexico, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington.
For an example of drastic legislation intended to discourage the use of
cognovit notes see BURNS IND. STAT. ANN. 2-2904, 5 and 6, and comments
thereon in Farabagh and Arnold, Commientaries on the Public Acts of Indiana,
(1927) 111, The Cognovit Note Act (1929) 5 IND. L.J. 93; Gavit, Tire Indiaa
Cognodvt Note Statute (1929) 5 IND. L.J. 208; Ogden, Negotiability of Judg-
ment Notes (1928) 3 IND. L.J. 695.
'See e.g. First Nat. Bk. v. White, 220 Mo. 717, 120 S.W 36, 132 Am. St.
Rep. 612 (1909), Utah Nat. Bk. v. Sears, 13 Utah 172, 44 Pac. 832 (189),
Farquhar & Co. v. DeHaven, 70 W Va. 738, 75 S.E. 65, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 956
(1912), see also cases cited in Ann. 44) L.R.A. (N.S.) 956.
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some other states would seem to demonstrate that it is a
device which has distinct advantages. One wonders that the
warrant of attorney has not been more widely utilized in
connection with other forms of written contract. In some
jurisdictions statutes limit its use to certain named instru-
ments."0 In other jurisdictions, including Ohio, there is
no restriction found in the statutes. Isolated instances
appear indicating the use of warrants of attorney in leases
and other instruments." In Pennsylvania and Illinois,
judging by the number of reported cases, it seems to be a
common practice to include a cognovit clause in a lease
whether of real or personal property "z The advantage
thereby given the lessor in taking judgment for overdue
rent is apparent. Since lessors are in much the same posi-
tion as payees of notes in being able to dictate the terms of
their contracts it is surprising that the cognovit clause has
not been inserted in leases more frequently than it has.
Warrants of attorney are also being used to a considerable
extent in connection with conditional sales contracts.' s
The standard forms of cognovit clause authorize "any
attorney at law to appear in any court of record," or "in
any court of record in Ohio," or "in any court of record in
the United States," and to confess judgment. Certain
questions are raised by the use of such language. Could
any person other than an attorney at law be authorized to
" See United Finance Corp. v. Peterson, 208 Wis. 104, 241 N.W 337
(1932), Roman Auto Co. v. Miller, 5 Boyce (Del.) 586, 95 Atl. 654 (1915).
'In Mithoff v. Columbus Lodge, K. of P., 7 Ohio N.P. 630, commented
upon m 34 W.L.B. (1895), a cognovit clause in a lease was upheld. At the
present time cognovit clauses appear in certain leases and similar instruments in
effect m Columbus.
'See Baldwin v. Amer. Motor Sales Co., 309 Pa. 275, 163 A. 507 (1932),
Beers v. Fallen Timber Coal Co., 307 Pa. 261, 161 A. 409 (1932), Gen. Realty
Co. v. Gold, 293 Pa. 260, 142 A. 279 (1928), Hyman v. Anschicks, 270 Ill.
App. 202 (1933), Richman v. Monrath, 266 11. App. 1 (1932).
' See Ann. Validity and effect of cognozit or warrant of attorney to confess
judgment is conditional sale contract, 89 A. L. R. 1106.
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su appear and confess judgment? While no Ohio cases
have been found which involved warrants authorizing
others than attorneys to confess judgment, cases in other
states have upheld such warrants.14 In Pennsylvania as
early as 1806 provision was made for the prothonotary en-
tering judgment on a note containing a warrant of attor-
ney without the agency of an attorney or even the neces-
sity of filing a declaration. "
If the warrant, as is usual, limits the authority to ap-
pear in "a court of record," this would limit the holder in
Ohio to filing his petition in the common pleas court or a
municipal court. Each municipal court act makes the court
thereby created a court of record. Except for the com-
mon pleas court other courts of record in this state
would have no jurisdiction in such matters." The amount
involved would determine whether the petition might be
filed in a common pleas court or in any given municipal
court. If the amount of the confessed judgment would be
$100 or less the common pleas court would have no juris-
diction.' If the amount exceeded the maximum jurisdic-
tion of the particular municipal court, the common pleas
court would be the only possibility "s Between $100 and
the maximum limit of the municipal court resort to either
the common pleas or municipal court would be possible. If
the warrant, departing from the usual form, purported to
authorize confession in any court, whether of record or
not, the result would be probably no different in this state.
"13 FREmiAN, JUDGMENTS (5th Ed. 1925) a722.
See Klein, The Entry of Judgment by Confession on Proinssory Notes,
32 DicK. L. Rm. 191 at 194 (1928).
",The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals
fixed by OHIO CONs?. Art. VI Sections 2 and 4 respectively does not include
such litigation. The Probate Court has not such jurisdiction since it is not
included in the enumerated classes in OHIO GEx. CODE, Sec. 10501-.53.
'
TOHIo G. C., Sec. 11215 and 10226.
"Except for another municipal court with a maximum jurisdictional limit
in excess of the amount claimed.
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It was held many years ago by the Supreme Court" and
since reaffrmed by a court of appeals" that the jurisdic-
tion of a justice of the peace is so limited that he cannot
render judgment under a warrant of attorney
A warrant which attempts to authorize appearance "in
any court of record in United States," or "in Ohio or else-
where" raises a rather difficult problem if exerc:sed in a
state other than that of execution. In some states such
authorization would be given effect and judgment permit-
ted pursuant thereto." Some of the inferior courts in
Ohio have looked with disfavor on a warrant purporting
to grant authority to confess judgment in a state other
than that in which it was drawn."2 The Ohio Supreme
Court has not been required to decide the question. " A
court in a state which has a policy opposed to warrants of
attorney to confess judgments will nevertheless give effect
to a judgment so confessed in another state in which the
judgment is valid."
Questions arise as to the parties who may execute valid
warrants of attorney to confess judgments. It was the
rule at common law that an infant's power of attorney
was void." In those states which generally recognize the
"McCleary v. McLain, 2 Ohio St. 368 (1863).
' City Loan and Say. Co. v. Kyler, 50 Ohio App. 390, 393, 198 N.E. 503,
18 Abs. 29, 2 Ohio Op. 303 (1934).
' 3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th Ed. 1925) 2717, citing Pine v. Stern,
97 Wis. 150, 65 Am. St. Rep. 103, 72 N. W 370 (1897), (The case is Pine v.
Conrad in 72 N.W 370).
'Davis v. Packer, 8 Ohio C.C. 107 (1894), McCure v. Bowles, 5 Ohio
N.P 327, 5 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 288 (1898).
' See Ann. Judgment ;entered tn stster state under a warrant of attorney to
confess judgment, 40 A.L.R. 441, Suppl. in 89 A.L.R. 1503.
"See Ann. Constitutionality, construction, application and effect of statutes
invalidating powers of attorney to confess judgment or contracts grvnng such
power, 111 A.L.R. 1407 at 1408, and Ann. Judgment entered tn sister state
under a warrant of attorney to confess judgnrent, 40 A.LR. 441, Suppl. in 89
A.L.R. 1503.
'S FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th Ed. 1925) 2708.
WARRANTS OF ATTORNEY
validity of warrants of attorney to confess judgment, such
a warrant executed by an infant is generally considered
void although there is some doubt whether it is not merely
voidable."0 An executor, administrator, guardian or other
fiduciary authorized to make promissory notes in his rep-
resentative capacity would certainly not be precluded from
including a cognovit clause in any such note."
Before a judgment by confession is rendered against
an individual it must clearly appear that he has authorized
such a judgment. Hence judgment can not be taken
against an indorser where he has not signed a warrant of
attorney although his indorsement appears on the back of
a note containing such a warrant signed by the maker "
One of the most common statements made by courts in
dealing with warrants of attorney is to the effect that they
must be strictly construed and that the authority given
must be strictly pursued. " Consistent with this idea it has
sometimes been held that a warrant which is joint in form
would not permit judgment against one of several joint
makers without the others, although there are authorities
to the contrary " In Ohio it seems to be established that
death of one joint maker will prevent entry of judgment
against the others."
A partner may successfully attack a judgment against
the partnership where the partner who signed the warrant
" See Ann. Infant's appointment of agent, and acts of agent thereunder as
void voidable, 31 A.L.R. 1001, i117. Metzger v. Zeissler, 13 Ohio N. P (N.S.)
49 (1912) , 31 C.J. 1003.
: 3 FREEmAN, JvDG.MERTS (5th Ed. 19"25) 2707.
Schuck v. McDonald, 58 Ohio App. 394, 399, 16 N.E. (2d) 613, 12 Ohio
Op. 23.3 (19.33). 3 FREEMAN, Op. Cit. supra n. 25 at 2746.
' Spence v. Emerine, 46 Ohio St. 433, 21 N.E. 866, 15 Am. St. Rep. 634
(1889), Cushman v. Welsh, 19 Ohio St. 536 (1869), 3 FREMAN, p. cit. "tpra
n. 25 at 2756, 23 Onro JurL, "Judgments," 738.
" See Ann. Warrant of attorney to confess judgment signed by two or more
as joint, or several, or joint and several, 89 A.L.R 403.
' Hoffmaster v. McKelvey Co., 88 Ohio St. .552, N.E. (1913) , Saulpaugh v.
Born, 22 Ohio App. 275, 1.54 N.E. 166 (1215)
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of attorney had no authority to do so." However the part-
ner signing the firm name is bound by the judgment so
taken."3 While a corporation may execute a valid warrant
of attorney to confess judgment the authority of the officer
or agent purporting to represent the corporation must be
expressly given or clearly implied from authority so
given. 84
Where judgment is sought on a cognovit note executed
in another state a difficult problem of conflict of laws is
raised.' Authority may be found for applying the law of
any one of several different places in determining the va-
lidity and effect of the warrant." The law-of the residence
of the maker, of the place of contracfing and of the forum
have each been suggested in one or more cases as prefer-
able." It seems that the most frequently prevalent rule is
that applying the place of performance when judgment is
sought there." In case it is sought in a state other than
that designated as the place of payment of the note, the law
of the forum would be preferred.
When judgment on a cognovit note has been rendered
13 FREEMAN, op. cit. supra n. 25 at 2711, Hurshman, Power of a Partner
to Confess Judgment against the Parnerships in Pennsylvama, (1914) 62 U.
PA. L. REv. 621, see McAlpin Co. v. Finsterwald, 57 Ohio St. 524, 544, 49
N.E. 784 (1898), Pace v. Pace, 57 Ohio App. 28", 13 N.E. (2d) .578, 10 Ohio
Op. 455, 26 0. L. Abs. 213 (1936).
fIlnd. See also 23 0. Jun. 749. Ann. Personal liability to other tarry to
contract of member of firm without authority, attempts to bind the firm,
4 A.L.R. 258, 262.
' 3 FREEMAN, op cit. supra n. 25 at 2713, see First Nat. Bk. v. McKinney,
16 Ohio C.C. 80, 85 (1898), Manley v. Mayer, 68 Kan. 377, 75 P 550 (1904),
Note (1928) 16 GEO. L. J. 495.
'See RESTATEMENT, CoNFLIcr OF LAWS (1934) Sec. 332, 343, 344, 347.
"See cases cited in Note, Jurisdictional ride concerning judgments con-
fessed under warrant of attorney, (1934) 3 BROOK. L. REv. 236.
"Ibid.
Ind. 3 FREEMAN, op. cit. supra n. 25 at 2723.
First Nat. Bk. v. McKinney, 16 Ohio C.C. 80 (1898), 3 FREEMAN, op. cit.
suPra n. 25 at 2724.
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in a state which recognizes the validity of such judgments,
it will be enforced in the courts of another state although
the policy of the latter is opposed to takinz such judg-
ments."0 It is generally held that the full faith and credi"
clause of the Federal Constitution4' extends to cognovit
judgments as well as to others.4 When suit is brought in
a state which prohibits or seriously restricts cognovit
judgments to enforce such a judgment taken in another
state it sometimes happens that there is a failure of proof
as to the laws of the other state with reference to warrants
of attorney In such situations two conflicting presump-
tions have been resorted to. A court in a state in which
warrants of attorney are not recognized may uphold a
cognovit judgment of a sister state indulging in the pre-
sumption that such judgment is fully justified under the
law prevailing at the place of its rendition." On the other
hand the presumption has been made that the law of the
other state is similar to that of the state of the forum and
' Cook v. Brown, 346 1o. 281, '140 S.W (2d) 42, 128 A.L.R. 1396 (1940),
Carroll v. Gore, 106 Fla. 582, 143 So. 633, 89 A.L.R. 1495 (1932), Ann. Judg-
nient entered in sister state tinder a warrant of attorney to confess judgnent,
40 A.L.R. 441, Suppl. in 89 A.L.R. 1503. But see Baldwin Bldg. & L. Assoc.
v. Klein, 136 Misc. Rep. 752, 240 N.Y.S. 804 (1930), holding that Pennsylvania
cognovit judgment against a New York resident was not conclusive in New
York. Note (1930) 30 Col- L. REv. 739; Bernard & Gloeckler Co. v. Baker Co.,
(1932 Tex. Civ. App.) 52 S.W (2d) .912; Note (1933) 11 Tin. L. REv. 246,
Note (1900) 51 CENT. L. Joup. 265.
'U.S. CoNsT., Art. IV, Sec. 1.
Note, Full faith and credit for judgments confessed by attorney, (1931)
44 HARv. L. REv. 1275 and authorities cited supra n. 40.
'3 The problem is somewhat affected by the state of the law relating to
judicial notice of the laws ot other states. In a third or more of the states laws
have been passed requiring such judicial notice. See Hallen, Uniform Evidence
Acts (1939) 6 O.S. L.J. 25, at 38. The Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign
Law Act, in modified form, was adopted in Ouo in 1939. OHro G.C. 12102-31
to 37, 118 O.L. 678.
"Hastings v. Bushong, 252 S.W 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
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the judgment held void because it would have been void in
the latter state if taken there."'
The Ohio Supreme Court" refused to recognize as
valid judgments entered by a prothonotary in Pennsyl-
vania upon cognovit notes not yet due although under the
law of Pennsylvania such judgments before maturity are
permissible." Presented with the same problem the New
York Court of Appeals took the other view Although
cognovit notes are not favored in New York, the court
said that a cognovit judgment entered before maturity in
Pennsylvania would be valid in New York because such
judgments were permitted not only by the law of Penn-
sylvania but by that of every other country where judg-
ments by confession are permitted."8
From the cases the following rules as to the termina-
tion of the authority contained in a warrant of attorney
may be gathered,
(1) The power to confess judgment being a part of a
contract in which rights are conferred is not rev-
ocable by the signer assuming that he was ca--
pable of making the contract."
(2) The power is terminated by the death of the
signer and in the case of joint signers by the death
of either "
,' McNair v. Underwood, 55 Okla. 585, 155 Pac. 553 (1916), Ham v. Coli,
20 Okla. 553, 95 Pac. 415 (1908).
"Spier v. Corll, 88 Ohio St. 236 (1877)
"Ann. 40 A.L.RL 441, cited supra n. 40 at 451.
'STeel v. Yost, 128 N.Y. 387, 28 N.E. 353, 18 L.R.A. 796 (1891). It should
be stated that such notes are non-negotiable even in Pennsylvania. See Klein,
Entry of judgment by confesswio. on promissory iwtes, (1928) 32 DicK. L.
Rav. 191 at 193, citing Milton Nat. Bank v. Beaver, 25 Pa. Super. 494 (1904),
and Hoverter v. Consedine, 82 Pa. Super. 294 (1923). Long prior to the adop-
tion of the Negotiable Instruments Law a similar view was expressed in the
famous case of Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346 (1846). See also Tanner, Uniform-
ity of Judgment Notex sn Pennsylvania, (1940) 44 DICK. L. Rav. 173 at 177.
3 FREPMAN, op. cit. supra n. 25 at 2724, 23 OHiO JuR., "Judgments," 741.
lbzd, Hoffmaster v. McKelvey Co., 88 Ohio St. 552, 106 N.E. 1061
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(3) A discharge in bankruptcy granted to the signer
terminates the prior authority to confess judg-
ment."'
(4) Subsequent insanity of the signer does not ter-
minate the authority 15
There is some confusion in the cases as to whether the
warrant of attorney executed as part of a note is a power
coupled with an interest.
The statement by the Ohio Supreme Court" that it is
a power coupled with an interest and cannot be revoked by
the maker nor by his insanity has been criticized by the
court of appeals in Schuck v McDonald.4 It is there
pointed out that the United States Supreme Court held in
(1913), Saulpaugh v. Born, ?2 Ohio App. 275, 154 N.E. 166 (19"25), Schuck
v. McDonald, 58 Ohio App. 394, 16 N.E. (2d) 619, 12 Ohio Op. 233, (1938),
Comment (1938) 12 U. CIN. L. REv. 613. Ann. Death or incompetency of
principal as affecting extsting power of attorney to confess judgment, 44 A.L.R.
1310. Compare, RESTATEMENT, AGErNCY (1933) Sec. 139 (1) "Unless otherwise
agreed, a power given as security is not terminated by- (a) revocation by the
creator of the power; (b) surrender by the holder of the power, if he holds for
the benefit of another; (c) the loss of capacity during the lifetime of either the
creator of the power or the holder of the power; or (d) the death of the
holder of the power, or, if the power is given as security for a duty which does
not terminate at the death of the creator of the power, by his death." Compare.
National Bank v. Jerko, 25 Ohio N.P (N.S.) 445, at 452 (1925) "This court
has had before it in the past a number of cases in which the payee, named in
a cognovit note such as this but not with the same warrant of attorney but
one which unquestionably was valid in this state, died and the court has held
in each instance that the personal representative of the payee could not take
advantage of the warrant of attorney but that jurisdiction over the defendant
could only be acquired by either this issuing of summons or the voluntary
appearance of the defendant. No one has seemingly seriously questioned the.
correctness of this holding."
1 3 OHIO JuL, "Judgments," 741, citing Dye v. Bartram, 5 0. Dec.
(Rep.) 508, 6 Am. L. Rec. 355 (1877).
" Swisher v. Orrison Cigar Co., 122 Ohio St 195, 171 N.E. 92 (1930),
:t3 OHIO Jur., "Judgments," 741.
'Ibid.
H58 Ohio App. 394, 16 N.E. (2d) 619, 12 Ohio Op. 23 (19M8), cited
supra n. 50. See also Comment (1938) 12 U. CIN. L. Rv. 613, Note (1931)
1 SO. CALIF. L. RE,. 315.
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Hunt v Ronsmiser55 that the power of attorney there in-
volved was a naked power. The court of appeals took the
same view with regard to the warrant of attorney in a cog-
novit note. It held the power terminated upon death of
the maker and distinguished the Sizsher case on the basis
of its involving insanity rather than death of the maker
Quotation is made from a Pennsylvania case Spencer v
Reynolds,"0 that "It is not a power coupled with an inter-
est, but it is a power which has grown up under our com-
mon and statute law, which the defendant cannot, by any
act of his, revoke."
The procedure for vacation of cognovit judgments in
Ohio is similar to that which applies to vacating other
judgments. During the same term of court at which the
judgment is rendered the proper procedure is by motion
and in such case the court has broad discretion in the mat-
ter of setting aside the judgment." For purposes of pre-
serving priority of lien the order of vacation is suspended
until the determination of the merits following an order of
vacation." The Supreme Court has held that the require-
ments of the statute pertaining to vacating judgments ren-
dered at a former term need not be followed where motion
to vacate is made at the same term."
At a subsequent term the procedure is to file a petition
in the original action, cause summons to be served on the
plaintiff who need not plead to the petition. The petition
should contain one or more of the grounds for vacation
'21 U.S.. (8 Wheat.) 174, 5 L. Ed. 589 (1823).
' 9 Pa. County Ct. Rep. 249 (1890).
"First National Bank v. Smith, 102 Ohio St. 120, 130 N.E. 602 (1921),
Edge v. Stuckey, 40 Ohio App. 122, 178 N.E. 210 (1931).
'See First National Bank v. Mullen, 7 Ohio N.P (N.S.) 313 at 831
(1908).
'First National Bank v. Smith, 102 Ohio St. 120, 130 N.E. 602, (1921).
cited mrfta n. 57.
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enumerated in the statute" and also the defense which will
be relied upon if the judgment is vacated." The court
must try and decide upon the grounds to vacate or modify
before trying or deciding upon the validity of the defense. 2
One of the grounds for vacating or modifying a judgment
after term is, "For taking judgments upon warrants of
attorney for more than was due the plaintiff, when the de-
fendant was not summoned or otherwise legally notified
of the time and place of taking the judgment." " It has
been held that this ground is applicable only where the de-
fendant is objecting to the amount of the judgment and
not where he contends that no judgment in any amount
should be rendered. 4 This holding has not been questioned
in later cases although another statement in the court's
opinion needs to be read in the light of a subsequent Su-
preme Court pronouncement. This statement is as fol-
lows "The better practice as I regard it, is to require the
defendant moving for vacation to proffer with his motion
an answer duly verified, setting forth his defense which
answer should be not merely a general denial of the peti-
tion, but should aver facts showing non-liability " "'
The Supreme Court case referred to involved the ac-
tion of a common pleas court in suspending a cognovit
judgment and giving leave for filing of a defense to the
note without such a showing as is required for vacating a
judgment rendered at a former term. The court of ap-
peals affirmed the judgment of the lower court and the
case was certified to the Supreme Court as being in conflict
'OHIo G. C. Sec. 11631.
" OHIo G. C. Sec. 11637.
'Onio G. C. Sec. 11636.
"OHIO G. C. Sec. 11631.
"' Metzger v. Zeissler, 13 Ohio N.P (N.S.) 49 (1912).
- Ibid. at 55.
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with another court of appeals case. The Supreme Court"8
recognized as a wholesome rule the practice of requiring
the same sort of showing for vacating a judgment at term
as is required for vacating after term. It held, however,
that with or without such a general rule in effect, the court
may not be limited or concluded in exercising its discretion-
ary control during term to the method of procedure out-
lined in the statute for vacating at a subsequent term."
In a court of appeals opinion the following statement
is found "This court has frequently held, where a mo-
tion to vacate a judgment is filed, that the presentation of
a valid defense is sufficient ground for vacating the judg-
ment and that a refusal to do so is an abuse of sound dis-
cretion." " With this in mind a study was recently made
in Franklin County Common Pleas Court." In a period
of approximately eighteen months from August 1937 to
February 1939 a total of 3510 civil cases were filed. 500
cases or 14.2 per cent of all the cases filed were those in-
volving cognovit notes.
Considering now the 500 cognovit judgments, in 343
of them execution in the form of fl-fa orders"' were issued
to the sheriff and 235 times certificates of judgment' were
issued. Very often both were used but in 157 cases no at-
"First .National Bank v. Smith, 102 Ohio St. 120, 130 N. E. 02 (1921),
cited szapra n. 57.
' Accord Edge v. Stuckey, 40 Ohio App. 122, 178 N.E. 210 (1931), cited
supra n. 57. Contra: City of Cincinnati v. Archiable, 4 Ohio App. 218, 21 Ohio
C.C. (N. S.) 582 (1915).
'Resnick v. Paryzek, 23 Ohio App. 327, 154 N.E. 350 (1926). This was a
default judgment.
'Mr. John M. Bowsher of the Columbus Bar made the study in the spring
of 1941 while he was a student in the -College of Law. The procedure followed
was to commence with cases filed long enough before the study to allow suffi-
cient time for the parties to have followed up the judgment. Two years was
taken as an adequate period and working backwards from that starting point
all cases were noticed until a total of 500 cognovit note cases had been studied.
"OHIO G. C. 11653 et seq.
OHio G. C. 11656,
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tempt was made to acquire a lien. This should not be
taken to indicate that all of these judgments were worth-
less, as the facts prove otherwise, for in 12 of these cases
satisfaction was had, in whole or in part.
In 162 of the cases in which execution was issued the
sheriff was able to find property of some kind belonging
to the debtor, but 36 of these levies were returned unsatis-
fied "on account of prior liens," and in 40 cases the writ
was marked "returned for want of time." And in 52 in-
stances execution was ordered by plaintiff's attorney to be
returned without any levy being made.
There were proceedings in aid of execution' in 68
cases and of this number 11 were applications for appoint-
ment of a receiver In 128 cases, 25.6 per cent of the
total, the judgment was paid in whole or in part and some-
times these payments were made a considerable length of
time after the judgments were taken. Although the study
was commenced about two years after the date of the
judgment of the most recent cases included in the study,
it is likely that in some cases collection of unpaid judg-
ments may yet take place.
Usually it is a simple matter to secure a judgment
where a person has a warrant of attorney to confess judg-
ment, and since there is also machinery for setting aside
such judgments, it is of practical value to gain some idea
of how often such machinery is employed and how often
the judgment is set aside.
The study revealed that in only 26 cases, 5.2 per cent,
was any attempt made to have the judgment set aside. Of
this number 22 were motions to vacate and 4 were peti-
tions. In 17 of the cases the judgments were set aside and
in only two of them were the motions or petitions over-
ruled. Two of the motions have never been ruled upon
'OHio G. C. 11768 et seq.
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and in five cases settlements were made and the cases dis-
missed without a ruling by the Court on the motions. In
the instances where the judgments were set aside, some-
times the cases were settled and dismissed, and in about
half of them they proceeded to trial. Two of the trials
resulted in verdicts for the defendant but in the others the
plaintiffs again got verdicts and judgments, usually for
the amounts of the original judgments.
Thus, it would seem that the warrant of attorney to
confess judgment is a useful device when out of five hun-
dred cognovit judgments only two were turned into ver-
dicts for the defendants. It is not surprising that there is
evidence of thought being given toward the extension of
the device to other areas than those in which it has been
customary heretofore.
